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Abstract 
Using data from 3,638 Spanish firms between 1996 and 2000, this article studies the relationship 
between the presence of large shareholders in the ownership structure of firms and R&D 
investment. Consistent with our theoretical contention, our results indicate that the impact of 
large shareholders on the R&D investment is (1) negative when blockholders are banks, (2) 
positive when blockholders are non-financial corporations, and (3) null when blockholders are 
individuals. In addition, we find a systematic negative relationship between the number of 
blockholders and R&D investment. Finally, we extend our study by analyzing the influence that 
the combined effect between blockholder type and R&D investment has on the firm’s economic 
performance. Results of this work provide relevant implications for policy makers and academic 
research. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The ownership structure of firms is recognized as an important determinant of its general 
investment policy and, in particular, of its research and development (R&D) spending (Lee and 
O'Neil, 2003, Porter, 1990). However, there is no consensus regarding the effect of ownership 
concentration on a firm’s R&D investment. To date, literature surrounding this relationship has 
only provided mixed results. While some studies showed a positive relationship between large 
shareholders and R&D investment (Hosono et al., 2004, Wahal and McConnell, 2000), others 
found negative (Yafeh and Yosha, 2003) or neutral (Francis and Smith, 1995, Holderness and 
Sheehan, 1988) association between these two variables.  
The aim of this paper is to reconcile these conflicting results by enriching the analysis of 
the firm's ownership structure. We move a step further from the simple characterization of the 
stake of the main blockholders as the main determinant of a firm's investment policy to 
incorporate two features: (1) the type of blockholders and (2) the number of blockholders 
necessary to control a firm. Previous research rested on the assumption that shareholders have 
homogenous preferences for R&D strategies. Only recently, the type of blockholder has received 
initial attention (e.g., Kochhar and David, 1996, Lee, 2005, Hoskisson et al., 2002). Extending 
this line of research, we explore three different types of blockholders, namely: banks, non-
financial corporations, and individuals. By introducing the type of blockholder as explicative 
element of a firm’s R&D investment, we can evaluate how differences in preferences of 
blockholders may influence this type of investment. Moreover, we consider the number of 
blockholders, a variable that has been largely neglected in previous studies, as an additional 
determinant that is relevant for understanding corporate innovation strategies.  
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Using a comprehensive database from Spanish firms, we collected data of 3,638 
companies during the period 1996-2000 to test our contention. We found that banks, which are 
more conservative investors and characterized by debt holdings in firms, influence negatively on 
R&D expenses, while non-financial blockholders, are more willing to promote innovative 
endeavors as there might be beneficial synergies for them.  Concerning individual blockholders, 
we observed a neutral impact on R&D investments, since two countervailing effects are at work. 
On the one hand, individual blockholders are likely to exhibit stringent monitoring since their 
stake represents a significant part of their wealth. Given that their vigilant capabilities can 
prevent opportunistic actions, individual blockholders are more likely to engage in complex 
R&D activities. On the other hand, there is an effect that hinders the agreement on the decisions 
to be taken when there is a wide heterogeneity among blockholders, affecting R&D initiatives. 
Furthermore, and based on the notion of this bargaining effect, we found differential 
consequences on R&D investments once we compare a small number of blockholders with a 
large number of them. As the number of blockholder increases, the aforementioned disagreement 
effect that hinders concurrence among them becomes larger. This, in turn,  negatively affects 
R&D initiatives. Finally, we suggest that combinations between blockholder types and R&D 
intensity influence the economic performance of firms in a way that is consistent with the 
foregoing determinants of R&D. That is, R&D investment in the presence of corporate 
ownership has a larger effect on performance that when banks or individuals are the 
blockholders.  
Our analysis offers remarkable implications for policy makers. In particular, this article 
sheds light on the characteristics of the ownership structure that governmental agencies should 
look at in order to allocate funds efficiently for stimulating firms’ R&D investments and their 
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performance. Also, the contrast of our contentions using a Spanish dataset is interesting in itself 
because it offers a European perspective and widens the traditional focus of this type of research 
mostly centered on U.S. companies. 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
The separation of ownership and control in modern corporations jointly with the 
existence of information asymmetries within the firm, spawn the possibility of opportunistic 
actions by the risk averse agent – the manager – who may have different objectives from a risk 
neutral principal – the owner– and thus pursue self-serving priorities, giving birth to the so-called 
agency problems (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). These problems are severe in R&D investment 
decisions and, consequently, the impact of ownership structure on R&D intensity is often studied 
in the context of agency theory (Baysinger et al., 1991, Lee, 2005, Tihanyi et al., 2003). Agency 
theory predicts that proper corporate governance mechanisms, like ownership concentration, can 
reduce agency problems and may help to ensure appropriate level of R&D investment since they 
curtail managers’ propensity to pursue inefficient strategies (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
The study of governance mechanisms to stimulate R&D investments is particularly 
relevant given that these investments improve the firm’s capability to innovate, which is 
expected to generate greater profits (Hirschey, 1985, Jose et al., 1986). However, R&D activities 
are characterized by three main traits that make agency costs particularly severe. First, they are 
inherently risky as they provide greater variability of outcomes and greater probability of failure 
despite the best effort of managers (Baysinger et al., 1991). Second, R&D activities require long-
term investments in projects that may have a negative impact on more immediate performance 
(Hoskisson et al., 1993). Consequently, risk-averse managers may be reluctant to invest in risky 
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long-term R&D projects (Mansfield, 1968). Third, R&D activities generally require high 
managerial autonomy (Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1987) to be effective since managers face a 
wide range of complex strategic choices. But, at the same time, risk-averse managers with great 
level of discretion may use their power to pursue low-risk strategies, avoiding R&D initiatives. 
Together, these characteristics can stimulate managerial opportunistic behavior s and increase 
agency costs. As a consequence, the ownership structure of the firm, which is a relevant 
mechanism o f controlling agents’ actions and preventing their opportunistic behavior, is likely to 
influence strategic decisions like R&D effort (Kochhar and David, 1996, Tihanyi et al., 2003, 
Hoskisson et al., 2002). However, previous empirical studies offer contradictory results, 
preventing from definitive conclusions. Our position, as argued next, is that these equivocal 
results can be explained by incorporating two features of blockholders: the type and number of 
blockholders.  
 
The type of blockholder  
Previous literature portrays different results regarding the link between large shareholders 
and innovation expenditures. Some studies found that a relationship (whether positive or 
negative) between the type of blockholder and R&D investment policy exists, whereas others 
postulate the non-existence of such a linkage. Concerning the first strand, several scholars (e.g., 
Wahal and McConnell, 2000, Hill and Snell, 1988, Baysinger et al., 1991) found the existence of 
a positive relationship between the presence of institutional shareholders and R&D investment. 
Conversely, Graves (1988) found in a sample of computer firms  that the presence of institutional 
blockholders damaged R&D investment. On the neutral strand of the literature, Chung et al. 
(2003) deduced that there is no effect on R&D investment due to the existence of institutional 
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holdings. Also, Francis and Smith (1995) did not find significant differences in R&D-to-sales 
ratio when compared management-controlled firms with externally-controlled ones (with large 
and external blockholders). 
A common characteristic of all these studies is that they assumed that ownership 
constituencies have identical preferences for corporate strategies. Only recently some studies 
have acknowledged the implications that the identity of such stakeholders can have for firms. A 
case in point is the work of Hoskisson et al. (2002), who found significant differences between 
two types of institutional owners (i.e., pension funds and professional investment funds) and 
firm’s innovation strategies. Similar to this work, we argue that each type of institutional 
blockholders has distinguishable impact on the firm’s R&D strategy. Unlike their work, 
however, we focus on three types of blockholders which have recognized particularities and 
deserve attention, namely banks, non- financial corporations, and individual blockholders.  
Previous empirical evidence suggests that ownership by banks might be related to R&D 
initiatives (Kochhar and David, 1996, Lee, 2005) but results are not conclusive. We expect bank 
blockholders to have a negative impact on R&D investment for several reasons. First, banks 
maintains business relationships with the firm in which they invest beyond simple ownership, 
often in the form of loans and credits (Kroszner and Strahan, 2001). This exposes banks, which 
are conservative institutions, to the uncertainty of R&D investment returns through two 
channels: credits and stakes. Second, the presence of banks stimulates firms to raise capital 
through debt financing (Petersen and Rajan, 1994). The larger the amount of debt, the larger the 
riskiness of this debt and the more important the distortions that this debt generates in a firm’s 
investment decisions. One of this distortions described in the literature is  the short-term 
investment bias (Grinblatt and Titman, 1998). A firm tends to invest in short-term projects as a 
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way to reduce the burden of its debt. This bias should hinder R&D- investments, which are 
mainly long-term oriented. The foregoing arguments lead to our first hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: There is a negative influence of a bank’s ownership on firm’s R&D 
investment intensity.  
 
The second type of institutional blockholder that we identify is the non- financial 
corporation. We expect a positive influence of the presence of this blockholder on R&D 
investment due to different reasons: 
First, compared to banks, non- financial corporations rarely have credit relationships with 
their controlled firms. This eliminates one channel of uncertainty in R&D investments for former 
corporations. Also, the non-existence of these credit relationships reduces debt riskiness and 
prevents investment inefficiencies like the aforementioned short-term investment bias which, in 
turn, would favor R&D investments. 
Second, non-financial corporations, unlike banks, are more likely to recognize the 
relevance of R&D investment as a pivotal input for their market success. The existence of 
reciprocal business relationships, potential synergies, and spillover effects between the owner 
and the controlled firms should favor R&D investment of the controlled firms (Jaffe, 1986). By 
investing in R&D, controlled firms can improve their absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 
1990), enhancing their ability to learn from the corresponding R&D investments of the owner 
firms. 
Last, in some occas ions, owner companies invest in R&D- intensive firms strategically 
with the intention of delegating to these firms, that are specialist in such activities, part of their 
R&D investments. This allows efficient investments and superior returns. This kind of behavior 
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is observed in the venture capital industry, where large corporations invest in start-up firms and 
give these firms incentives for investing in R&D- intensive projects. If these start-up firms 
become successful, corporations integrate them in their own division as a way of improving their 
own R&D investments. Therefore, we can state as our second hypothesis : 
 
Hypothesis 2: There is a positive influence of non-financial corporation’s ownership on 
firm’s R&D investment intensity. 
 
The last type of blockholder that we identify is the individual or non- institutional 
blockholder. For this type of blockholder, we expect a neutral relationship between its presence 
and the R&D investment intensity of the controlled firm due to the existence of two 
countervailing effects. Baysinger et al. (1991) argued that the absence of systematic relationship 
between ownership concentration among individual shareholders and R&D investment is due to 
the heterogeneity of individual investor in terms of risk preference and investment horizons. This 
heterogeneity of individuals is translated into two opposite effects. 
On the one hand, monitoring is enhanced because individual blockholders' stakes 
represent a significant part of their wealth and thus have an incentive to better observe managers' 
action. This enhanced monitoring is expected to favor the investment in complex R&D activities.  
On the other hand, agreements on long-term R&D- intensive projects are more difficult to 
achieve when there is  great heterogeneity among blockholders that have to take the decision 
(disagreement effect). That is, conflicting voices are likely to be present when there is risk and 
investment horizons heterogeneity among owners (Hoskisson et al., 2002). 
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While these two countervailing effects are likely to exert influence on R&D investments, 
it is unclear whether one will have predominance over the other one, or instead they would 
cancel out. Thus,   
 
Hypothesis 3: There is an ambiguous impact of individual ownership on firm’s R&D 
investment intensity. 
 
Number of blockholders  
We focus on an additional dimension of ownership structure : the number of blockholders 
that form a coalition to control the firm (control group with a stake larger than 50%). We argue 
that ceteris paribus, increases in the  number of blockholders within control group have an impact 
on R&D investment policy. This is so because the existence of a set of large shareholders with 
different individual objectives makes more difficult to reach consensus on firm decisions, 
especially in those decisions that involve a long-term agreements like those to undertake R&D-
intensive projects. This is the aforementioned disagreement effect.  
Moreover, the existence of a large number of blockholder weakens the degree of 
monitoring of manager’s actions since vigilant responsibilities are diluted among a greater 
number of dominant shareholders. This, in turn, enhances managerial discretion and 
consequently managers have greater leeway to pursue low-risk strategies and show self-serving 
behavior (Finkelstein and Boyd, 1998, Tosi et al., 1997), evading risky R&D projects. Thus, we 
hypothesize the existence of a negative relationship between the number of blockholders and 
firm R&D investment policy. 
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Hypothesis 4: The number of blockholders has a negative influence on firm’s R&D 
investment intensity. 
 
The impact of the combined effect between blockholder type and R&D expenditures on 
firm performance 
The discussion leading to the above hypotheses concerns with the differential effects that 
blockholder type and their number would have on the controlled firm’s R&D intensity. However, 
as we mentioned above, the ultimate reason for investing in R&D is to improve the firm’s 
performance. Consequently, a reasonable extension is to analyze whether ownership structure is 
exclusively a determinant of R&D or it also plays an additional moderating role connecting R&D 
investments and performance. In this article, we content that the impact of R&D expenditures on 
performance is contingent to the type of blockholder. 
Given the above considerations concerning different types of blockholders, we expect 
that corporate owners are more efficient in channeling R&D investment into productive 
outcomes. This is so because they have superior skills – due to their own experience in such 
investments – and have more incentives, as they may want to integrate eventually their R&D-
intensive controlled firms within their own corporation,  than banks or other individuals have. 
Thus, our last hypothesis reads: 
 
Hypothesis 5:  There is a larger marginal impact of R&D investments on performance 
when corporations are blockholders compared with other types of 
blockholders like banks or individuals. 
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METHODS 
Sample and Data 
To test the empirical predictions, we use the SABE databases for the years 1996 through 
2000. These databases, available from Bureau Van Dijk, provide the ownership structure, 
balance sheets, and income statements for over 190,000 Spanish firms (95% of all Spanish 
companies) that deposit their financial statements in the Central Mercantile Register (Registro 
Mercantil Central). We restrict the sample using three criteria: we eliminate firms that do not 
report the ownership  structure, those that do not present detailed financial statements and those 
that are not corporations (cooperatives, partnerships, and proprietorship). Moreover, these three 
criteria have to be satisfied for at least three of the five available years. We are left with an 
unbalance panel of 3,638 different firms and 12,685 firm-year observations. 
  
Measures 
Dependent variables 
R&D intensity. The variable to characterize a firm’s R&D policy is its R&D intensity 
that is defined in terms of the ratio of R&D expenditures to total sales.  
Financial performance. We approach to firm performance through the Return on Assets 
(ROA) defined as the ratio earnings before interests and taxes to the total value of assets. 
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Independent  variables 
Variables of ownership structure.  
The first dimension of the ownership structure we focus on is the type of blockholders. 
We distinguish between banks, non- financial corporations, and individuals. In particular, we 
define as Bank ownership the stake in the hands of banks; Corporate ownership the stake in the 
hands of other firms; and Individual ownership the stake in the hands of individuals (non-
institutional blockholders). Three comments are in order. First, we have aggregated the stake in 
the hands of the individuals with the same surname in the understanding that they belong to the 
same family. Second, following La Porta et al.  (1999),  we consider a blockholder as a 
shareholder who has at least 10% of the shares. Last, we follow Bennedsen and Wofelzon (2000) 
to define the number of blockholders that form the controlling coalition (Number controlling 
blockholders). When the largest shareholder owns more than 50% of the shares, we assume that 
it is the only member of the coalition. When the largest shareholder owns less than 50%, for a 
given ownership structure many different controlling coalitions may be formed. In a rough 
simplification we assume that in this case the two largest shareholders will always be in the 
coalition. If the joint stake of the two largest shareholders is lower than 50% then the coalition 
will also include the third largest shareholder and so on and so forth. 
To study crossed effects between the aforementioned dimensions, we consider variables 
Bank ownership´Number that is the product of Bank ownership times the Number controlling 
blockholders. Following the same logic, we define Corporate ownership´Number and Individual 
ownership´Number.  
In the performance specifications, we identify those firms with a value of R&D intensity 
larger than the mean for the sector in the corresponding year with a dummy variable dummy 
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R&D. Also, we consider the interactive effect of the ownership structure and R&D investment on 
a firm performance. This leads to define the following variables Bank ownership´R&D that is 
the product of Bank ownership times the Dummy R&D variable. Following the same logic, we 
define Corporate ownership´R&D, Individual ownership´R&D, and Number controlling 
blockholders´R&D.  
 
Control variables 
We control for size effects with the Sales variable that is the amount of sales on a log 
scale. We also control for the financial structure, which is captured with two variables. First, 
Debt-to-equity, which is the ratio of book value of debt to the book value of equity. Second, 
Internal funds-to-assets, which is the ratio of a firm’s internal funds to the overall value of a 
firm’s assets. In order to avoid potential endogeneity problems, we also control for previous 
performance. We lagged the ROA variable one period and named it ROA{t-1}. Finally, we 
introduce as an additional control a variable family that is a dummy that is equal to 1 when there 
are blockholders that belong to the same family. 
We have controlled for sector and year by detracting from the dependent variables its 
mean value by year and 1-digit sector in the fixed-effect estimation. 1  For non fixed-effect 
estimations, we introduced temporal and sectoral dummies. 2  
 
Data Analysis and Model specification 
Our main specification is aimed to test the effect of the presence of different types of 
blockholders as well as its number on a firm’s R&D investment intensity. We accompany the 
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variables that characterize the ownership structure mentioned before, with the foregoing controls. 
Specifically, we focus on the following specification: 
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To test the effects on performance of different combinations of blockholders and a firm’s 
R&D investment, we used the following specification:  
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It is important to emphasize that under both types of estimations, we recognize the 
possible existence of unobservable heterogeneity iu  (or iu ¢ ) potentially correlated with a firm’s 
ownership st ructure and/or a firm’s performance. We consider that the reasons that may explain 
the presence of a particular type of blockholder may be perfectly related with a firm’s R&D 
policy and/or its performance. That is, there may be some unobservable firm’s characteristics, 
like managerial skills, that trigger a particular type of R&D policy as well as a firm’s 
performance and the same characteristics also may attract a particular type of blockholder. This 
may generate a correlation between a firm’s intrinsic and unobservable characteristics iu (or iu ¢) 
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and its type of blockholder. We deal with this problem by making use of fixed-effect techniques 
(within group estimators). 3  
 
RESULTS 
We provide in Table 1 a description of the main variables that we use in order to test our 
hypotheses. We have to note the large ownership concentration of Spanish firms as the stake of 
the largest blockholder is 68.97%. Also, the stake in the hands of banks is, on average, 30.79%; 
in the hands of other corporations is 77.47%; and of individuals 67.14%. 4  
We also observe that the number of blockholders in the controlling coalition is 
significantly lower for those firms that invest significantly in R&D (i.e. when the dummy R&D 
variable is equal to 1) in comparison with those that do not, suggesting initial support for 
Hypothesis 4. Finally, those firms that invest intensively on R&D are more profitable, larger and 
less leveraged. 
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 2 shows the results of the presence of different types of blockholders on a firm’s 
R&D intensity. In row 1 there is the result of specification (1), while in rows (2), (3), (4), we 
incorporate additional variables to study the moderator effect of the number of blockholders on 
the connection between blockholders’ types and R&D investment. The full model is estimated in 
row (5). 
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
Once we focus on the type of blockholder, we find that banks’ ownership has a 
significant negative impact on R&D investment; the presence of non-financial blockholders 
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stimulates this kind of investments, while non- institutional blockholders (individuals) does not 
have a significant impact on the R&D investment. These results conform to Hypotheses 1, 2 and 
3 respectively. 
Concerning the number of blockholders, all specifications show a negative impact on a 
firm’s R&D intensity. It seems that a disagreement effect exists, which hinders R&D investments 
as predicted by Hypothesis 4. 
The interaction between the types of blockholders and their number reveals that the 
existence of a large number of blockholder has a negative moderating effect when other 
corporations have a controlling role in a firm. 
Finally, we observe that those variables related to the financial structure (debt-to-equity 
and internal funds-to-assets) do not have a significant impact on R&D investment once we 
introduce variables of ownership structure. These results suggest that the connection between 
financial structure and R&D investment is fully mediated by a firm’s ownership structure. 
Finally, we focus on the possible moderating effect of ownership structure on the impact 
of R&D investments on performance (see Table 3). We find that this is positive and significant 
only when non- financial firms are the largest blockholders (positive and significant coefficient of 
Corporate ownershipxR&D variable in row 2 of Table 5). This conforms to Hypothesis 5. 
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Decisions regarding the magnitude and allocation of R&D expenditures are extremely 
important for corporations, particularly in some sectors, and it is crucial to identify the 
configurations that foster innovation activities. Thus, this study is important for both investors 
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and public authorities, as it helps identifying idiosyncratic ownership structures that favour R&D 
investment. Furthermore, we have investigated the relationship between ownership structure and 
corporate R&D investment in Spain. Previous studies have examined this relationship in the U.S. 
and Japan (Lee and O'Neil, 2003, Lee, 2005, Porter, 1992), but studies about the effects of 
ownership structure in European settings are inexistent. To the best of our knowledge, this is the 
first one of this kind and, thus, brings a European perspective into this field of research. 
 
The type of blockholders  
Large shareholders play a decisive role in critical corporate decisions (Tirole, 2001). 
These blockholders have the incentives and the power to influence management’s discretion with 
respect to R&D strategies. However, previous literature has provided ambiguous results 
concerning ownership concentrations and R&D investments, and has generally assumed that 
ownership constituencies have identical preferences for innovation strategies. This article offers 
an alternative perspective that helps reconciling conflicting results found in the literature. 
In this study we have examined the effect of three blockholders, namely banks, non-
financial corporations, and individuals, on R&D investment.  Our findings indicated that bank 
ownership is negatively related with R&D investments, whereas non- financial corporation 
ownership shows a positive impact and individual ownership has a neutral effect. 
We have drawn on the conservatism of banks in their investment policy and in their 
potential role as lenders of their partially-owned firms to justify their negative impact on a firm’s 
R&D investment. Also, we have connected the presence of banks with a superior capacity to 
raise debt. This increases the debt riskiness which, in turn, generates inefficiencies like the short-
term investment bias. This damages R&D investments, which are mainly long-term oriented. 
            18 
We have relied upon the knowledge accumulated through their own R&D investment 
track to justify the positive impact of the presence of non-financial corporations on R&D 
investment of controlled firms. Owner firms have incentives to influence managerial decisions 
towards R&D projects developed within their controlled firms, as they can take advantage of 
future spillovers. 
The neutral effect of individual ownership that we have found is consistent with the 
evidence found by Baysinger et al. (1991). This is explained by the characteristics of this group: 
they have more powerful incentives to scrutiny managerial decisions than institutional 
blockholders (i.e., banks and corporations) because individual blockholders' stakes represent a 
significant part of their wealth, but at the same time, the high heterogeneity of these blockholders 
complicate the agreement on what investments should be made (disagreement effect). This 
damages a firm’s R&D investments.  
 
The number of blockholders  
We stressed that not only the identity and the amount of stakes of large shareholders 
influence the R&D policy, but also the number of blockholders. The existence of a set of large 
shareholders with different preferences makes more difficult their agreements on firm decisions, 
which may depress R&D investments. We have found empirical support for our expectation of a 
negative impact of the number of blockholders on a firm’s R&D. 
This result is somewhat in line with the notion of managerial discretion treated by the 
agency literature (Finkelstein and Boyd, 1998). As the stock ownership is more disperse (greater 
number of stockholders), managerial discretion increases and risk averse managers would 
allocate resources away from risky projects like R&D investment. This suggests that investors 
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should invest with caution in firms with a high number of blockholder, especially if the company 
belongs to a high- tech sector, where innovation is vital for organizational survival.  
 
Performance analysis  
The previous discussion raises a natural question: Does the control device of large 
shareholders lead to select appropriate investment decisions? 
Our results suggested that when firms engage in conspicuous R&D projects (i.e., R&D 
investments higher than the mean of the sector), the presence of non-financial corporations as 
large shareholders has a positive impact on financial performance. This result is an illustration of 
the positive influence of corporations, which are expected to have their own experience in 
managing R&D investments, in leading their partially-owned firms to choose those projects that 
improve the financial performance. 
 
Policy implications  
The results reported in this paper have important policy implications. First, in the past 
decades governments worldwide set out privatization programs of state-owned firms. In some 
cases, like the Czech Republic, the ownership structure of the firms that emerged after the 
privatization was very diluted. Our results indicate that an excessive dilution of ownership (an 
increase in the number of blockholders) has a negative impact on the R&D investments 
incentives of the recently-privatized firms. Second, and following the privatization framework, 
governments should give prior ity to other firms instead of banks if they wanted to create 
reference blockholders in the privatized firms. Last, governmental agencies that allocate funds to 
stimulate firms’ R&D investment should take into consideration the relevant role that ownership 
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structure plays in promoting such investments and also in moderating their impact on 
performance. As a rule of thumb, these agencies should give priority to those firms participated 
by other firms in their ownership structure as significant blockholders. 
 
Future research 
Our study can be extended in different ways. First, future research could address an 
aspect that has been barely mentioned in the paper: To what extend R&D investments may be 
used as a mechanism of earnings management by controlling blockholders? It could be argued 
that by investing in R&D, firms may channel more easily accounting expenses to investment 
ones and smooth income. Given this, institutional blockholder with a controlling stake in R&D-
intensive firms may stimulate these practices in order to consolidate this income smoothing in 
their own balance sheet. 
A second possible avenue refers to the use of alternative measures of corporate 
governance, and financial performance (e.g., market-based measures), to which we did not have 
access but would allow a more finely grained analysis to validate our analysis. In addition to this, 
ownership structure is only one mechanism that may influence R&D investment; others may be 
the composition of the board or the duality of the CEO. Then, it may be of interest to examine 
other relationships between governance mechanisms and innovation. 
Finally, it would be of great interest to explore the relationships between corporate 
governance structures, financial structures, and R&D decisions. Our results hint an interesting 
and complex relationship, where the connection between financial structure and R&D investment 
is fully mediated by a firm’s ownership structure, raising an exiting avenue to be pursued in 
future research.  
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End Notes 
1  We use a classification of sectors (CNAE) that has a correspondence with more standard SIC codes (available 
upon request).  
2  We had to rule out sectoral and temporal dummies in the fixed-effect estimation because these variables would 
have been dropped out. 
3  The way to inspect whether there is correlation or not is through the Hausman test that studies whether systematic 
differences exist between those coefficients of the fixed-effect estimation and those of the random-effects 
estimations. If this null hypothesis is rejected, the only consistent estimator is the fixed-effects one. If not, the best 
alternative is to use the random-effect estimation. Additionally, in unreported estimations, we allowed for the 
possibility of a second endogeneity problem not linked to the unobservable heterogeneity, but to the error 
component. We addressed this problem making use of GMM techniques. However, results barely change from those 
provided in Tables 2 and 3. Hence, the main source of endogeneity is the unobservable heterogeneity that has been 
eliminated through fixed-effect estimations. 
4  It is remarkable that we obtain a positive impact on R&D investment only for the presence of corporations, which 
have, on average, a larger stake. Hence, it seems that the larger the stake of blockholders, the larger the incentives 
for investing in R&D.  
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TABLE 1 
Means and Standard Deviations  
 Mean St. Dev. R&D=1 a R&D=0 a T-test (p-
value) R&D intensity 0.006 0.058 0.046 0.001 0.000*** 
ROA 0.090 0.189 0.102 0.088 0.008*** 
Bank ownership 30.787 33.559 27.062 31.657 0.261 
Corporate ownership 77.469 29.741 74.653 81.403 0.000*** 
Individual ownership 67.143 37.868 72.516 57.523 0.000*** 
Stake of the largest blockholder 68.969 31.359 69.945 68.839 0.199 
Number controlling blockholders 1.279 0.723 1.229 1.285 0.004*** 
Sales 14.774 1.391 14.871 14.761 0.004*** 
Debt-to-equity 6.979 549.091 1.364 7.686 0.686 
Internal funds-to-assets 0.377 0.317 0.364 0.379 0.077* 
Family 0.148 0.356 0.068 0.150 0.000*** 
a We define R&D=1 (0), when R&D intensity is larger or equal  (lower) than the mean for 
the sector (1-digit) and year. The rest of the variables are defined in the text. 
* p = 0.10; ** p = 0.05; *** p = 0.01 
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TABLE 2 
Determinants of R&D Investment Intensity: Full Sample a 
Dependent variable: R&D / Total sales b 
Joint effect of blockholder & number of blockholders Independent variables: 
Full model 
Banks Corporations  Individuals Full model 
      
Bank ownership –0.0377*** –0.0438***   –0.0421*** 
Bank ownership´Number  0.0066   0.0041 
Corporate ownership 0.0226**  0.0778***  0.0852*** 
Corporate ownership´Number   –0.0538***  –0.0644*** 
Individual ownership 0.0193   0.0352 –0.0082 
Individual ownership´Number    –0.0120 0.0331 
Number controlling blockholders –0.0274*** –0.0307*** –0.0173** –0.0200** –0.0261*** 
Sales –0.0056 –0.0029 –0.0067 –0.0054 –0.0050 
Debt-to-equity 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
Internal funds-to-assets 0.0085 0.0087 0.0047 0.0053 0.0074 
ROA {t-1} c –0.0105* –0.0101 –0.0136** –0.0125** –0.0113* 
Family 0.0041 0.0029 –0.0040 –0.0041 0.0035 
Intercept 0.0005 –0.0071** –0.0054 –0.0083 0.0014 
      
Hausman Test 25.61 (0.002) 26.70 (0.001) 12.39 (0.135) 11.19 (0.191) 28.63 (0.000) 
Effects Fixed-effects Fixed-effects Random-effects Random-effects Fixed-effects 
F Test 3.53*** 2.96***   3.68*** 
Chi-squared   29.47*** 13.94*  
N 8,221 8,221 8,221 8,221 8,221 
a Standardized regression coefficients are shown in the table. 
b The dependent variable is corrected by sector and year in the fixed-effect estimations. All the variables are defined in the text. 
c ROA(t-1) means ROA lagged by one period. We have lagged this variable to avoid potential endogeneity problems. 
   * p = 0.10  ** p = 0.05 *** p = 0.01 
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TABLE 3 
Performance Analyses by the Type of Blockholder a 
 Dependent variable: ROA 
Independent variables:  Full model 
   
Bank ownership  -0.0022 -0.0008 
Bank ownership ´R&D  -0.0052 
Corporate ownership 0.0636*** 0.0295 
Corporate ownership´R&D  0.0590*** 
Individual ownership  0.0613*** 0.0610*** 
Individual ownership ´R&D  0.0056 
Number controlling blockholders -0.0181* -0.0165 
Number controlling blockholders´R&D  -0.0105 
Dummy R&D -0.0089 -0.0111 
Sales 0.0578*** 0.0588*** 
Debt-to-equity 0.0008 0.0009 
Internal funds-to-assets 0.4342*** 0.4347*** 
Family 0.0068 0.0072 
Intercept 0.0041 0.0023 
   
Hausman Test 27.32 (0.2427) 26.66 (0.482) 
Effects Random effects Random-effects 
Chi-squared 1371.07***    1384.32*** 
N 12,444 12,444 
a Standardized regression coefficients are shown in the table. The estimations include 
temporal and sectoral dummy variables. All the variables are defined in the text. 
p = 0.10; ** p = 0.05; *** p = 0.01 
 
